We study blind fingerprinting, where the host sequence into which fingerprints are embedded is partially or completely unknown to the decoder. This problem relates to a multiuser version of the Gel'fand-Pinsker problem. The number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown, and the colluders and the fingerprint embedder are subject to distortion constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content fingerprinting finds applications to document protection for multimedia distribution, broadcasting, and traitor tracing [1] - [4] . A covertext-image, video, audio, or text-is to be distributed to many users. A fingerprint, a mark unique to each user, is embedded into each copy of the covertext. In a collusion attack, several users may combine their copies in an attempt to "remove" their fingerprints and to forge a pirated copy. The distortion between the pirated copy and the colluding copies is bounded by a certain tolerance level. To trace the forgery back to the coalition members, we need fingerprinting codes that can reliably identify the fingerprints of those members. Essentially, from a communication viewpoint, the fingerprinting problem is a multiuser version of the watermarking problem [5] - [10] . For watermarking, the attack is by one user and is based on one single copy, whereas for fingerprinting, the attack is modeled as a multiple-access channel (MAC) . The covertext plays the role of side information to the encoder and possibly to the decoder.
Depending on the availability of the original covertext to the decoder, there are two basic versions of the problem: private and public. In the private fingerprinting setup, the covertext is available to both the encoder and decoder. In the public fingerprinting setup, the covertext is available to the encoder but not to the decoder, and thus decoding performance is generally worse. However public fingerprinting presents an important advantage over private fingerprinting, in that it does not require the vast storage and computational resources that are needed for media registration in a large database. For example, a DVD player could detect fingerprints from a movie disc and refuse to play it if fingerprints other than the owner's are present. Or Web crawling programs can be used to automatically search for unauthorized content on the Internet or other public networks [3] .
The scenario considered in this paper is one where a degraded version S d of each host symbol S is available to the decoder. Private and public fingerprinting are obtained as special cases with S d = S and S d = ∅, respectively. We refer to this scenario as either blind or semiprivate fingerprinting. The motivation is analogous to semiprivate watermarking [11] , where some information about the host signal is provided to the receiver in order to improve decoding performance. This may be necessary to guarantee an acceptable performance level when the number of colluders is large.
The capacity and reliability limits of private fingerprinting have been studied in [7] - [10] . The decoder of [10] is a variation of Liu and Hughes' minimum equivocation decoder [12] , accounting for the presence of side information and for the fact that the number of channel inputs is unknown. Two basic types of decoders are of interest: detect-all and detect-one. The detect-all decoder aims to catch all members of the coalition and an error occurs if some colluder escapes detection. The detect-one decoder is content with catching at least one of the culprits and an error occurs only when none of the colluders is identified.
A third type of error (arguably the most damaging one) is a false positive, by which the decoder accuses an innocent user.
In the same way as fingerprinting is related to the MAC problem, blind fingerprinting is related to a multiuser extension of the Gel'fand-Pinsker problem. The capacity region for the latter problem is unknown. An inner region, achievable using random binning, was given in [13] . This paper derives random-coding exponents and an upper bound on detect-all capacity for semiprivate fingerprinting. Neither the encoder nor the decoder know the number of colluders. The collusion channel has arbitrary memory but is subject to a distortion constraint between the pirated copy and the colluding copies. Our fingerprinting scheme uses random binning because, unlike in the private setup, the availability of side information to the encoder and decoder is asymmetric. To optimize the error exponents, we propose an extension of the stacked-binning scheme that was developed for single-user channel coding with side information [11] . Here the codebook consists of a stack of variable-size codeword-arrays indexed by the conditional type of the covertext sequence. The decoder is a minimum doubly-penalized equivocation (M2PE) decoder or equivalently, a maximum doubly-penalized mutual information (M2PMI) decoder.
The proposed fingerprinting system is universal in that it can cope with unknown collusion channels and unknown number of colluders, as in the private fingerprinting setup of [10] . A tunable parameter ∆ trades off false-positive and false-negative error exponents. The derivation of these exponents combines techniques from [10] and [11] . A preliminary version of our work, assuming a fixed number of colluders, was given in [14] , [15] .
A. Organization of This Paper
A mathematical statement of our generic fingerprinting problem is given in Sec. II, together with the basic definitions of error probabilities, capacity, error exponents, and fair coalitions. Sec. III presents our random coding scheme. Sec. IV presents a simple but suboptimal decoder that compares empirical mutual information scores between received data and individual fingerprints, and outputs a guilty decision whenever the score exceeds a certain tunable threshold. Sec. V presents a joint decoder that assigns a penalized empirical mutual information score to candidate coalitions and selects the coalition with the highest score. Sec. VI establishes an upper bound on blind fingerprinting capacity under the detect-all criterion. Finally, conclusions are given in Sec. VII. The proofs of the theorems are given in appendices. March 4, 2008 DRAFT
B. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, calligraphic letters for finite alphabets, and boldface letters for sequences. We denote by M ⋆ the set of sequences of arbitrary length (including 0) whose elements are in M. The probability mass function (p.m.f.) of a random variable X ∈ X is denoted by p X = {p X (x), x ∈ X }. The entropy of a random variable X is denoted by H(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by 
All logarithms are in base 2 unless specified otherwise.
Denote by p x the type, or empirical p.m.f. induced by a sequence x ∈ X N . The type class T x is the set of all sequences of type p x . Likewise, we denote by p xy the joint type of a pair of sequences (x, y) ∈ X N × Y N and by T xy the type class associated with p xy . The conditional type p y|x of a pair of sequences (x, y) is defined by p xy (x, y)/p x (x) for all x ∈ X such that p x (x) > 0. The conditional type class T y|x given x, is the set of all sequencesỹ such that (x,ỹ) ∈ T xy . We denote by H(x) the empirical entropy of the p.m.f. p x , by H(y|x) the empirical conditional entropy, and by I(x; y) the empirical mutual information for the joint p.m.f. p xy .
We use the calligraphic fonts P X and P
[N ]
X to represent the set of all p.m.f.s and all empirical p.m.f.'s, respectively, on the alphabet X . Likewise, P Y |X and P
Y |X denote the set of all conditional p.m.f.s and all empirical conditional p.m.f.'s on the alphabet Y. A special symbol W K will be used to denote the feasible set of collusion channels p Y |X1,··· ,XK that can be selected by a size-K coalition. We define |t| + max(t, 0) and exp 2 (t) 2 t . The indicator function of a set A is denoted by 1 {x∈A} . Finally, we adopt the convention that the minimum of a function over an empty set is +∞ and the maximum of a function over an empty set is 0.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. Overview
Our model for blind fingerprinting is diagrammed in Fig. 1 . Let S, X , and Y be three finite alphabets.
The covertext sequence S = (S 1 , · · · , S N ) ∈ S N consists of N independent and identically distributed shared between encoder and decoder, and not publicly revealed. The random variable V is independent of S and plays the role of a cryptographic key. There are 2 N R users, each of which receives a fingerprinted copy: 
) the extension of this measure to length-N sequences. The code f N is subject to the distortion constraint
on the formation of coalitions. The colluders combine their copies X K {X m , m ∈ K} to produce a pirated copy Y ∈ Y N . Without loss of generality, we assume that Y is generated stochastically as the output of a collusion channel p Y|XK . Fidelity constraints are imposed on p Y|XK to ensure that Y is "close" to the fingerprinted copies X m , m ∈ K. These constraints can take the form of distortion constraints, analogously to (2.2). They are formulated below and result in the definition of a feasible class W K of attacks.
The decoder knows neither K nor p Y|XK selected by the K colluders and has access to the pirated copy Y, the secret key V , as well as to S d , a degraded version of the host S. To simplify the exposition, the 
of the coalition. A possible decision is the empty set,K = ∅, which is the reasonable choice when an accusation would be unreliable. To summarize, we have Definition 2.1: A randomized rate-R length-N fingerprinting code (f N , g N ) with embedding distortion
The randomization is via the secret key V and can take the form of permutations of the symbol positions {1, 2, · · · , N }, permutations of the 2 N R fingerprint assignments, and an auxiliary time-sharing sequence, as in [6] - [10] , [16] .
We now state the attack models and define the error probabilities, capacities, and error exponents.
B. Collusion Channels
The conditional type p y|xK is a random variable whose conditional distribution given x K depends on the collusion channel p Y|XK . Our fidelity constraint on the coalition is of the general form
where W K is a convex subset of P Y |XK . That is, the empirical conditional p.m.f. of the pirated copy given the marked copies is restricted. Examples of W K are given in [10] , including hard distortion constraints on the coalition:
The collusion channel p Y|XK is said to be fair if P r[p y|xK ∈ W f air K ] = 1. For any fair collusion channel, the conditional type p y|xK is invariant to permutations of the colluders.
Strongly exchangeable collusion channels [7] . Now denote by π a permutation of the samples of a length-N sequence. For strongly exchangeable channels, p Y|XK (πy|πx K ) is independent of π, for every (x K , y). The channel is defined by a probability assignment P r[T y|xK ] on the conditional type classes.
The distribution of Y conditioned on Y ∈ T y|xK is uniform:
C. Error Probabilities
Let K be the actual coalition andK = g N (Y, S d , V ) the decoder's output. The three error probabilities of interest in this paper are the probability of false positives (one or more innocent users are accused),
the probability of failing to catch a single colluder,
and the probability of failing to catch the full coalition:
These three probabilities are obtained by averaging over S, V , and the output of the collusion channel p Y|XK . In each case the worst-case probability is denoted by
where P e denotes either P F P , P one e or P all e , and the maximum is over all feasible collusion channels, i.e., such that (2.4) holds.
D. Capacity and Random-Coding Exponents Definition 2.2:
A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion D 1 , collusion class W K , and detect-one criterion if there exists a sequence of (N, ⌈2 N R ⌉) randomized codes (f N , g N ) with maximum embedding distortion D 1 , such that both P one e,N (f N , g N , W K ) and P F P,N (f N , g N , W K ) vanish as N → ∞. Definition 2.3: A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion D 1 , collusion class W K , and detect-all criterion if there exists a sequence of (N, ⌈2 N R ⌉) randomized codes (f N , g N ) with maximum embedding distortion D 1 , such that both P all e,N (f N , g N , W K ) and 
event for the detect-one problem is also an error event for the detect-all problem.
III. OVERVIEW OF RANDOM-CODING SCHEME A brief overview of our scheme is given in this section. The decoders will be specified later. The scheme is designed to achieve a false-positive error exponent equal to ∆ and assumes a nominal value K nom for coalition size. Two arbitrarily large integers L w and L u are selected, defining alphabets
identify a certain optimal type class T * w and conditional type classes
X|U SW (u, s, w) for every possible (u, s, w). Optimality is defined relative to either the thresholding decoder of Sec. IV or the joint decoder of Sec. V. The secret key V consists of a random sequence W ∈ T w * and the collection (3.1) of random codebooks indexed by s d , w, λ.
A. Codebook
A random constant-composition code
is generated for each pair of sequences
random sequences independently and uniformly from an optimized conditional type
, and arranging them into an array with 2 N R columns and 2 N ρ(λ) rows. Similarly to [11] (see Fig. 2 therein) , we refer to ρ(λ) as the depth parameter of the array.
B. Encoding Scheme
Prior to encoding, a sequence W ∈ W N is drawn independently of S and uniformly from T * w , and shared with the receiver. Given (S, W), the encoder determines the conditional type λ = p s|s d w and performs the following two steps for each user 1 ≤ m ≤ 2 N R .
. If more than one such l exists, pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let u = u(l, m, λ). If no such l can be found, generate u uniformly from the conditional type class T * U |SW (s, w). 2) Generate X m uniformly distributed over the conditional type class T * X|U SW (u, s, w), and assign this marked sequence to user m.
C. Worst Collusion Channel
The fingerprinting codes used in this paper are randomly-modulated (RM) codes [10, Def. 2.2]. For such codes we have the following proposition, which is a straightforward variation of [10, Prop. 2.1] with S d in place of S at the decoder.
Proposition 3.1:
For any RM code (f N , g N ), the maximum of the error probability criteria (2.8) over all feasible p Y|XK is achieved by a strongly exchangeable collusion channel, as defined in (2.7).
To derive error exponents for such channels, it suffices to use the following upper bound:
which holds uniformly over all feasible probability assignments to conditional type classes T y|xK .
D. Encoding and Decoding Errors
The array depth parameter ρ(λ) takes the form
where u is any element of T * U |SW (s, w), and ǫ > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. The analysis shows that given any (s, w), the probability of encoding errors vanishes doubly exponentially.
The analysis also shows that the decoding error probability is dominated by a single joint type class 
IV. THRESHOLD DECODER
A. Decoding
The decoder has access to (y, s d , w) but does not know the conditional type λ = p s|s d w realized at the encoder. The decoder evaluates the users one at a time and makes an innocent/guilty decision on each user independently of the other users. Specifically, the receiver outputs an estimated coalitionK if and only ifK satisfies the following condition:
If no suchK is found, the receiver outputsK = ∅. This decoder outputs all user indices whose empirical mutual information score, penalized by ρ(λ), exceeds the threshold R + ∆.
Observe that the maximizing λ in (4.1) may depend on m. With high probability, this event implies a decoding error. Improvements can only be obtained using a more complex joint decoder, as in Sec. V.
B. Error Exponents
Define the following set of conditional p.m.f.'s for (XU )
i.e., the conditional marginal p.m.f. p XU |SW is the same for each (X m , U m ), ∀m ∈ K. Also define the sets
where in (4.2) the random variables
Define for each m ∈ K the set of conditional p.m.f.'s
and the pseudo sphere packing exponent
Taking the maximum and minimum ofẼ psp,m above over m ∈ K, we respectively definẽ
),Ẽ psp,m is independent of m ∈ K, and the two expressions above coincide. Define
Denote by p * W and p * XU |SW the maximizers in (4.7), the latter to be viewed as a function ofp S|W . Both p * W and p * XU |SW implicitly depend on R and W f air K
. Finally, define
The terminology pseudo sphere-packing exponent is used because despite its superficial similarity to a real sphere-packing exponent, (4.4) does not provide a fundamental asymptotic lower bound on error probability.
Theorem 4.1:
The decision rule (4.1) yields the following error exponents.
(i) The false-positive error exponent is
(iv) A fair collusion strategy is optimal under the detect-one error criterion:
The detect-one and detect-all error exponents are the same when the colluders emply a fair
(vi) For K = K nom , the supremum of all rates for which the detect-one error exponent of (4.12) is positive is the divergence between their joint distribution and the product of their marginals:
The symbol
• I is used to distinguish it from ordinary mutual information I between two random variables. Similarly one can define a conditional mutual information
and an empirical mutual information Recall that x A denotes {x m , m ∈ A} and that the codewords in (3.1) take the form u(l, m, λ). In the following, we shall use the compact notation (xu) A (x A , u A ), and
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A. M2PMI Criterion
Given y, s d , w, the decoder seeks the coalition size k, the conditional host sequence type λ ∈ P
[N ]
S|S d W , and the codewords u(l, m, λ) in C(s d , w, λ) that maximize the M2PMI criterion below. The column indices m ∈ K, corresponding to the decoded words form the decoded coalitionK. If the maximizing k in (5.2) is zero, the receiver outputsK = ∅.
The Maximum Doubly-Penalized Mutual Information criterion is defined as
where
B. Properties
The following lemma shows that 1) each subset of the estimated coalition is significant, and 2) any further extension of the coalition would fail a significance test. The proof parallels that of Lemma 5.1
in [10] and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 5.1: LetK, λ, lK achieve the maximum in (5.3) (5.2), i.e., uK = u(lK, mK, λ). Then for each subset of the estimated coalitionK, we have ∀A ⊆K :
Moreover, for every A disjoint withK,
C. Error Exponents
Define for each A ⊆ K the set of conditional p.m.f.'s
Taking the maximum 1 and the minimum ofẼ psp,A above over all subsets A of K, we definẽ
Now define 
The decision rule (5.2) yields the following error exponents.
(iii) The detect-one error exponent is
1 The property that K achieves max A⊆KẼpsp,A is established in the proof of Theorem 5.2, Part (iv).
(vi) If K = K nom , the supremum of all rates for which the error exponent of (5.15) and (5.14) are positive is
under the "detect-one" criterion, and by
under the "detect-all" criterion. If the colluders select a fair collusion channel, as is their collective interest, the minimization is restricted to W f air K in (5.17), and then
For the special case of private fingerprinting ( Similarly to the single-user case [11] , when U = X the binning scheme is degenerate.
D. Bounded Coalition Size
Assume now that K is known not exceed some maximum value K max . The same random coding scheme can be used. In the evaluation of the M2PMI criterion of (5.2), the maximization is now limited to 0 ≤ k ≤ K max . In Lemma 5.1, property (5.4) holds, and property (5.5) now holds for every A disjoint withK, and of size |A| ≤ K max − |K|. Following the derivation of the error exponents in the appendix, we see that these exponents remain the same as those given by Theorem 5.2.
Blind watermarking. The case K max = 1 represents blind watermark decoding with a guarantee that the false-positive exponent is at least equal to ∆. In this scenario, there is no need for a time-sharing sequence w, and the decoder's input y is either an unwatermarked sequence (K = 0) or a watermarked sequence (K = 1). The M2PMI criterion of (5.3) reduces to
The resulting false-positive and false-negative exponents are given by ∆ and
respectively.
VI. UPPER BOUNDS ON PUBLIC FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY
Deriving public fingerprinting capacity is a challenge because the capacity region for the Gel'fandPinsker version of the MAC is still unknown, in fact an outer bound for this region has yet to be established. Even in the case of a MAC with side information causally available at the transmitter but not at the receiver, the expressions for the inner and outer capacity regions do not coincide [23] . Likewise, the expression derived below is an upper bound on public fingerprinting capacity under the detect-all criterion.
Recall the definition of the set
, where W and U are random variables defined over alphabets W = {1, 2, · · · , L w } and U = {1, 2, · · · , L u }, respectively. Here we define the larger set
Using the same derivation as in Lemma 2.1 of [11] , it can be shown that C all Lw,Lu (D 1 , W K ) is a nondecreasing function of L w and L u and converges to a finite limit. Moreover, the gap to the limit may be bounded by a polynomial function of L w and L u , see [11, Sec. 3.5] for a similar derivation.
Theorem 6.1: Public fingerprinting capacity is upper-bounded by
under the "detect-all" criterion.
Proof: see appendix.
We conjecture that the upper bound on capacity given by Theorem 6.1 is generally not tight. The insight here is that the upper bound remains valid if the class of encoding functions is enlarged to include feedback from the receiver: feedback can increase public fingerprinting capacity. We conjecture the answer is yes, because feedback is known to increase MAC capacity [24] .
We also make the stronger conjecture that the maximum over p (XU )K|SW is achieved by a p.m.f. that decouples the components (X k , U k ), k ∈ K, conditioned on (S, W ). If this is true, the set P outer
in the formula (6.2) can be replaced with the smaller set .2), and the random coding scheme of Sec. V is capacity-achieving.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a communication model and a random-coding scheme for blind fingerprinting. While a standard binning scheme for communication with asymmetric side information at the transmitter and the receiver may seem like a reasonable candidate, such a scheme would be unable to trade false-positive error exponents against false-negative error exponents. Our proposed binning scheme combines two ideas.
The first is the use of a stacked binning scheme as in [11] , which demonstrated the advantages (in terms of decoding error exponents) of selecting codewords from an array whose size depends on the conditional type of the host sequence. The second is the use of an auxiliary time-sharing random variable as in [10] .
The blind fingerprint decoders of Secs. IV and V combine the advantages of both methods and provide positive error exponents for a range of code rates. The tradeoff between the two fundamental types of error probabilities is determined by the value of the parameter ∆. We derive the error exponents for the thresholding rule (4.1). We have W = {1, 2, · · · , L w } and
where (A.2) is obtained by application of the chain rule for divergence. Also define
Denote by p * w and p * xu|sw the maximizers above, the latter viewed as a function of p s|w . Both maximizers depend implicitly on R and W f air Knom . Let 
by continuity of the divergence and mutual-information functionals.
Consider the maximization over the conditional type p xu|sw in (A.5). As a result of this maximization, we may associate the following:
• to any (s, w), a conditional type class T * U |SW (s, w) T * u|sw ; 
S|S d W by drawing exp 2 {N (R + ρ(p s|s d w ))} random sequences independently and uniformly from the conditional type class T * U |S d W (s d , w), and arranging them into an array with 2 N R columns and exp 2 {N ρ(p s|s d w )} rows.
Encoder. Prior to encoding, a sequence W ∈ W N is drawn independently of S and uniformly from T * w , and shared with the receiver. Given (S, W), the encoder determines the conditional type p s|s d w and performs the following two steps for each user 1 ≤ m ≤ 2 N R .
. If more than one such l exists, pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let u = u(l, m, p s|s d w ). If no such l can be found, generate u uniformly from the conditional type class T * U |SW (s, w). 2) Generate X m uniformly distributed over the conditional type class T * X|U SW (u, s, w).
Collusion channel. By Prop. 3.1, it is sufficient to restrict our attention to strongly exchangeable collusion channels in the error probability analysis.
Decoder. Given (y, s d , w), the decoder outputsK if and only if (4.1) is satisfied.
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Encoding errors. Analogously to [11] , the probability of encoding errors vanishes doubly exponentially with N because ρ(p s|s d w ) > I(u; s|s d w). Indeed an encoding error for user m arises under the following event:
(A.10)
The probability that a sequence U uniformly distributed over
} on the exponential scale. Therefore the encoding error probability, conditioned on type class T sw , satisfies
where the inequality follows from 1 − a ≤ e −a .
The derivation of the decoding error exponents is based on the following two asymptotic equalities which are special cases of (C.2) and (C.5) established in Lemma 3.1.
1) Fix y, s d , w and draw u uniformly from some fixed type class, independently of (y, s d , w). Then
uniformly from a conditional type class T xu|sw , and then draw y uniformly over a single conditional type class T y|xK . For any ν > 0, we have of false positives, conditioned on the joint type class T y(xu)Ksw , is
where (a) is obtained by application of (A.12) with ν = ρ(λ) + R + ∆, and (b) because the number of conditional types λ is at most (N + 1) |S| Lw .
Averaging over all type classes T y(xu)Ksw , we obtain P F P ≤ 2 −N ∆ , from which (4.10) follows.
(ii). Detect-One Error Criterion (Miss All Colluders). We first derive the error exponent for the event that the decoder misses a specific colluder m ∈ K. Any coalitionK that contains m fails the test (4.1),
i.e., for any suchK,
This implies that
where l is the row index actually selected by the encoder, and p s|s d w is the actual host sequence conditional type. The probability of the miss-m event, given the joint type p * w p s|w p * xu|sw , is therefore upper-bounded by the probability of the event (A.17):
where (a) follows from (A.13) with ν = R + ∆.
The miss-all event is the intersection of the miss-m events over m ∈ K. Its conditional probability is
Averaging over S, we obtain
which establishes (4. 
(iii). Detect-All Error Criterion (Miss Some Colluders).
The miss-some event is the union of the miss-m events over m ∈ K. Given the joint type p * w p s|w p * xu|sw , the probability of this event is
which establishes (4. (iv). Fair Collusion Channels. The proof parallels that of [10, Theorem 4.1(iv)], using the conditional 
It is not feasible, and thus a positive exponent E one is guaranteed, if R <
The supremum of all such R is given by (4.13) and is achieved by
We derive the error exponents for the M2PMI decision rule (5.2). Define for all A ⊆ K
Denote by p * w and p * xu|sw the maximizers in (B.6), the latter viewed as a function of p s|w . Both maximizers depend implicitly on R, D 1 , and W f air Knom . Let
The exponents (B.3)-(B.8) differ from (5.7)-(5.12) in that the optimizations are performed over March 4, 2008 DRAFT conditional types instead of general conditional p.m.f.'s. We have
The codebook and encoding procedure are exactly as in the proof of Theorem IV, the difference being that p * w and p * xu|sw are solutions to the optimization problem (B.6) instead of (A.5). The decoding rule is the M2PMI rule of (5.2).
To analyze the error probability for this random-coding scheme, it is again sufficient to restrict our attention to strongly-exchangeable channels and use the bound (3.2) on the conditional probability of the collusion channel output. We also use Lemma 3.1.
(i). False Positives. By application of (5.4), a false positive occurs ifK \ K = ∅ and
The probability of this event is upper-bounded by the probability of the larger event ∀A ⊆K : ∃λ, lK :
Denote by p * s|s d w the conditional type of the host sequence and by l * K the row indices selected by the encoder. To each triple (K, λ, lK), we associate a unique subset B of K ∩K defined as follows:
Thus B is the set of colluder indices k ∈ K for which the decoder correctly identifies the conditional host sequence type p * s|s d w and the codewords u(l * k , k, p * s|s d w ) that were assigned by the encoder. Denoting by Ω(B) the set of pairs (λ, lK) associated with B, we rewrite (B.12) as ∀A ⊆K : ∃B ⊆ K ∩K, ∃(λ, lK) ∈ Ω(B) :
Define the complement set A =K \ B which is comprised of all incorrectly accused users as well as any colluder k such that λ = p * s|s d w or l k = l * k . Since B ⊆K and there is at least one innocent user inK, the cardinality of A is at least equal to 1. By construction of the codebook and definition of A and B, u(l A , m A , λ) is independent of y and u(l * B , m B , p * s|s d w ). The probability of the event (B.13) is upper-bounded by the probability of the larger event ∃B ⊆ K, ∃λ, l A , m A :
Hence the probability of false positives, conditioned on T y(xu)Ksw , satisfies
∃λ, l A , m A :
where 
where (a) is obtained by application of (C.2) with yu(l * B , m B , p * s|s d w ) in place of z. Combining (B.15) and (B.17) we obtain
Averaging over all joint type classes T y(xu)Ksw , we obtain P F P ≤ 2 −N ∆ , from which (5.13) follows.
(ii). Detect-All Criterion. (Miss Some Colluders.)
Under the miss-some error event, any coalitionK that contains K fails the test. By (5.4), this implies
In particular, forK = K we have ∃A ⊆ K :
where l K are the row indices actually selected by the encoder, and p s|s d w is the actual host sequence conditional type. The probability of the miss-some event, conditioned on (s, w), is therefore upper bounded by the probability of the event (B.19):
where (a) follows from (C.5) with ν = R + ∆.
Averaging over S, we obtain , w) , is bounded as
where (a) follows from (C.5) with ν = R + ∆. To bound P r[K = I], we use property (5.5) withK = I and A = K, which yields
combining the two inequalities above yields
The probability of this event is again given by (B.21); we conclude that
Averaging over S and proceeding as in Part (ii) above, we obtain
which establishes (5.15). 
These p.m.f.'s are feasible for (5.6) if and only if the inequality below holds:
They are infeasible, and thus positive error exponents are guaranteed, if
From Part (iv) above, we may restrict our attention to
under the detect-one criterion.
Since the p.m.f. of (S, W, (XU ) K , Y ) is permutation-invariant, by application of [10, Eqn. (3. 3)] with
Hence the supremum of all R for error exponents are positive is given by 
uniformly from a conditional type class T xu|sw , and then draw Y uniformly from a single conditional type class T y|xK . We have
For any feasible, strongly exchangeable collusion channel, for any A ⊆ K and ν > 0, we have
Proof: The derivation of (C.4), (C.3), and (C.5) parallels that of (D.12), (D.15) and (D.16) in [10] .
APPENDIX IV PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
Let K be size of the coalition and (f N , g N ) a sequence of length-N , rate-R randomized codes. We show that for any sequence of such codes, reliable decoding of all K fingerprints is possible only if
Recall that the encoder generates marked copies
and that the decoder outputs an estimated coalition g N (y,
We use the notation
To prove that C all (D 1 , W K ) is an upper bound on capacity, it suffices to identify a family of collusion channels for which reliable decoding is impossible at rates above C all (D 1 , W K ). As shown in [10] , it is sufficient to derive such a bound for the compound family W K of memoryless channels.
Our derivation is an extension of the single-user compound Gel'fand-Pinsker problem [11] to the multiple-access case. A lower bound on error probability is obtained when an oracle informs the decoder that the coalition size is at most K.
There are
We represent such a coalition as
Our derivations make repeated use of the identity
which follows from the chain rule for conditional mutual information and holds for any (U K , S, Y, Z).
The total error probability (including false positives and false negatives) for the detect-all decoder is
Step 1. Following the derivation of [10, Eqn. (B.20) ] with (Y, S d , V ) in place of (Y, S, V ) at the receiver, for the error probability
Step 2. Define the i.i.d. random variables
Also define the random variables
The following properties hold for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
• By (D.1) and (D.5),
• The random variables
• Due to the term Y i−1 in (D.5), the random variables
Step 3. Consider a time-sharing random variable T that is uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , N } and independent of the other random variables, and define the tuple of random variables (S, Since (S i , W i , U K i ) → X K i → Y i forms a Markov chain, so does (S, W, U K ) → X K → Y . From (D.7), the joint p.m.f. of (S, W, U K , X K , Y ) takes the form
(D.8)
In (6.1) we have defined the set
: p X1|SW = · · · = p XK |SW , and Ed(S,
where |W| = L w and |U | = L u . Observe that p X K U K W |S defined in (D.8) belongs to
Define the collection of K indices K = {1, 2, · · · , K} and the following functionals indexed by A ⊆ K:
(D.10)
Step 4. We have 
